From: paul@poboy.b17c.ingr.com (Paul Robichaux)
Date: Tue, 15 Feb 94 08:23:36 PST
To: mnemonic@eff.org (Mike Godwin)
Subject: Re: Clipper and Traffic Analysis
In-Reply-To: <199402151428.JAA29394@eff.org>
Message-ID: <199402151611.AA20806@poboy.b17c.ingr.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
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Mike Godwin asks whether one of Clipper's attractive points (well, not

to us, anyway) is the increased ability of LE to do traffic analysis.

> The reason I ask is, I have this sense that one reason the government
> likes Clipper is that the Law Enforcement Access Field enables agents
> to draw inferences about who's talking to whom and what they're saying,
> even without decrypting the actual communications.

Of course! Let's say that you call someone who's under Clipper
surveillance. Of course, you use your Clipperphone(*). The feds can
now go to a judge and say "Well, we know the holder of this key ID
called the suspect we have under surveillance... we want to surveil
_his_ line too." Guilt by association.

The agents should ideally have lawful authorization to be monitoring
the line, but think how easy it would be to do full-time, real-time
traffic analysis based on LEAF information.

- -Paul

(*) Not meant to imply that Mike would be likely to use a Clipperphone.

- -- 
Paul Robichaux, KD4JZG     | PGP key via finger & keyservers.
perobich@ingr.com          | Be a cryptography user- ask me how.
Intergraph Federal Systems | Of course I don't speak for Intergraph.
	       

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