From: Nesta Stubbs <nesta@nesta.pr.mcs.net>
To: Cypherpunks <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Message Hash: f0363ac340c7ad10026fee1af8639f1eeadc312a44dc7a3f42ecc1eeeec7f0a3
Message ID: <Pine.3.89.9412271842.E15684-0100000@nesta.pr.mcs.net>
Reply To: <199412280046.TAA26043@crypto.com>
UTC Datetime: 1994-12-28 01:02:35 UTC
Raw Date: Tue, 27 Dec 94 17:02:35 PST
From: Nesta Stubbs <nesta@nesta.pr.mcs.net>
Date: Tue, 27 Dec 94 17:02:35 PST
To: Cypherpunks <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Re: Making sure a program gets to the receiver intact
In-Reply-To: <199412280046.TAA26043@crypto.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.89.9412271842.E15684-0100000@nesta.pr.mcs.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
On Tue, 27 Dec 1994, Matt Blaze wrote:
> including tamper-evident seals on their packages, but until consumers
> learned to expect the seals, all the bad guys had to do was remove
> the seal entirely before replacing the tainted packages. In the short
> term, given today's infrastructure, there's not a lot you can do.
>
> Of course, in the medium- and long- term, the best solution is to
> design good schemes and deploy them widely enough that people learn
> to expect them.
>
One solution, or start of a solution, is to tell the user about the
signature checks, and how to go about verifying them in teh README text
file, that most users come to expect in a package of software. Or
perhaps add into the tar and zipped packagea file called SIGNATURECHECK
or something suitably obvious, as well as explaining it. I believe most
users expect the README file enough to look in it, at least skimming it.
i want to know everything http://www.mcs.com/~nesta/home.html
i want to be everywhere Nesta's Home Page
i want to fuck everyone in the world &
i want to do something that matters /-/ a s t e zine
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