From: Ray Cromwell <rjc@clark.net>
To: anon-remailer@utopia.hacktic.nl (Anonymous)
Message Hash: 548604a522a0436cec8b6c1cbdfffa2cc2a212eca4069cb3aa20f4adb0a20405
Message ID: <199507242349.TAA23120@clark.net>
Reply To: <199507242313.BAA27191@utopia.hacktic.nl>
UTC Datetime: 1995-07-24 23:49:41 UTC
Raw Date: Mon, 24 Jul 95 16:49:41 PDT
From: Ray Cromwell <rjc@clark.net>
Date: Mon, 24 Jul 95 16:49:41 PDT
To: anon-remailer@utopia.hacktic.nl (Anonymous)
Subject: Re: An idea about Java and remailer clients and servers...
In-Reply-To: <199507242313.BAA27191@utopia.hacktic.nl>
Message-ID: <199507242349.TAA23120@clark.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
>
> Phil Fraering writes:
> > Why not "charge" for the ability to send an anonymous message with
> > the duty to have for a short time (maybe an hour or two) running
> > on your machine a node in a remailer network?
>
> User X on Machine A sends a form via HTTP (or a variant- SHTTP, HTTPS, etc.)
> to Machine B. User Y on Machine C receives an anonymous mail from Machine
> B. Suspecting User X, User Y sends a mail to be anonymized and sent back to
> himself to User X. User X's temporary remailer does as it's told. User Y
> now has a strong reason to suspect User X has sent the said mail.
If the "duty" cycle is 1 hour and there are 10000 users utilizing
the network, that tells you nothing. All it does it confirm that
User X sent a remailer message within the last hour. One could just
as easily finger User X and use the same reasoning.
And if one has to suspect User X in the first place, User X has already
blown his cover partially (either by writing style or other leaks)
-Ray
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