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1996-01-12 - Re: Novel use of Usenet and remailers to mailbomb from luzskru@cpcnet.com

Header Data

From: lull@acm.org (John Lull)
To: abostick@netcom.com (Alan Bostick)
Message Hash: 2844f7c953d2a54296d590e9c4f3986dc9d6fdf1d0cbe2a1cee781331c89d6a9
Message ID: <30f6de9e.28100489@smtp.ix.netcom.com>
Reply To: <Q6q9w8m9LYlM085yn@netcom.com>
UTC Datetime: 1996-01-12 23:08:15 UTC
Raw Date: Sat, 13 Jan 1996 07:08:15 +0800

Raw message

From: lull@acm.org (John Lull)
Date: Sat, 13 Jan 1996 07:08:15 +0800
To: abostick@netcom.com (Alan Bostick)
Subject: Re: Novel use of Usenet and remailers to mailbomb from luzskru@cpcnet.com
In-Reply-To: <Q6q9w8m9LYlM085yn@netcom.com>
Message-ID: <30f6de9e.28100489@smtp.ix.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Fri, 12 Jan 1996 10:55:12 -0800, you wrote:

> Cypherpunks:  is there any way to respond to, or prevent, this sort of
> attack short of actually shutting down the remailer?  

Yes, very simply.

The remailer could calculate a hash for the body of each encrypted
message received (the same portion which will be decrypted by PGP),
tabulate the last few thousand hashes, and simply discard any messages
with a duplicate hash.  The target of the attack would receive only
the first copy of the message.

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