1996-02-01 - Re: No FV supporters?

Header Data

From: Nathaniel Borenstein <nsb@nsb.fv.com>
To: sameer@c2.org>
Message Hash: 3433730b52c54cb047a3437c0956edd838b7470e1a5769b4a5b87fc398afca73
Message ID: <Al3zxOeMc50eNT2K8w@nsb.fv.com>
Reply To: <199601310119.RAA29332@infinity.c2.org>
UTC Datetime: 1996-02-01 01:13:35 UTC
Raw Date: Thu, 1 Feb 1996 09:13:35 +0800

Raw message

From: Nathaniel Borenstein <nsb@nsb.fv.com>
Date: Thu, 1 Feb 1996 09:13:35 +0800
To: sameer@c2.org>
Subject: Re: No FV supporters?
In-Reply-To: <199601310119.RAA29332@infinity.c2.org>
Message-ID: <Al3zxOeMc50eNT2K8w@nsb.fv.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Excerpts from mail.cypherpunks: 30-Jan-96 Re: No FV supporters?
sameer@c2.org (711*)

> 	Would someone like to implement such a thing? That would be
> "the cypherpunk way" of properly debunking FV's claims.

As I just explained, I don't think it would be nearly as effective as
our attack.  But for the record, I must remind everyone on this list of
an important line that should not be crossed:

Our program *demonstrated* key parts of a comprehensive attack on
software-encrypted credit card numbers, but it most carefully did NOT
implement those parts of that attack which would facilitate the actual
theft and transport of those numbers.  If anyone can similarly design
and demonstrate a comprehensive attack on FV, that's their affair. 
However, if they don't follow our lead in acting responsibly, and
instead choose to unleash their software as a live attack, First Virtual
reserves the right to track them down to the best of its abilities and
prosecute them to the full extent of the law.

That's another important aspect of "process security" or multi-layer
security.   You take the legalities seriously.  -- Nathaniel
--------
Nathaniel Borenstein <nsb@fv.com>
Chief Scientist, First Virtual Holdings
FAQ & PGP key: nsb+faq@nsb.fv.com





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