From: Black Unicorn <unicorn@schloss.li>
Date: Mon, 27 May 1996 17:21:52 +0800
To: jim bell <jimbell@pacifier.com>
Subject: Re: An alternative to remailer shutdowns
In-Reply-To: <199605251737.KAA26055@mail.pacifier.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.SUN.3.93.960527021103.2291B-100000@polaris.mindport.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Sat, 25 May 1996, jim bell wrote:

> At 12:10 AM 5/25/96 EDT, E. ALLEN SMITH wrote:
> >From:	IN%"unicorn@schloss.li"  "Black Unicorn" 24-MAY-1996 22:52:03.64

> >	Why the first in chain? If the anti-traffic-analysis provisions are
> >working properly, it should be impossible to prove that a given first remailer
> >was the first remailer for any particular message. I had thought that even
> >civil courts required that you be the person who committed some act, not the
> >person who _might_ have committed some act. Otherwise, all the remailers are
> >in danger. This is even if someone tries an entrapment by sending through some
> >illegal material - if the courts accept that they should be allowed to do this,
> >then all the remailers they chained are going to be hit.
> 
> Likewise, I don't see why the first address in the chain is vulnerable, as 
> long as the message subsequently passes through at least one trustworthy 
> remailer, and probably  a temporary output address.  

I repeat, all it takes is one person to send through only one remailer
(perhaps even a Co$ plant) and the first in chain remailer is toasted.

Think before you type please.

> Jim Bell
> jimbell@pacifier.com

---
My preferred and soon to be permanent e-mail address:unicorn@schloss.li
"In fact, had Bancroft not existed,       potestas scientiae in usu est
Franklin might have had to invent him."    in nihilum nil posse reverti
00B9289C28DC0E55  E16D5378B81E1C96 - Finger for Current Key Information
Opp. Counsel: For all your expert testimony needs: jimbell@pacifier.com