From: jim bell <jimbell@pacifier.com>
Date: Mon, 27 May 1996 06:33:12 +0800
To: "E. ALLEN SMITH" <EALLENSMITH@ocelot.Rutgers.EDU>
Subject: Re: An alternative to remailer shutdowns
Message-ID: <199605251737.KAA26055@mail.pacifier.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


At 12:10 AM 5/25/96 EDT, E. ALLEN SMITH wrote:
>From:	IN%"unicorn@schloss.li"  "Black Unicorn" 24-MAY-1996 22:52:03.64
>
>>Remailers on the attack points (first in chain, last in chain) simply MUST
>>be disposable as tissue.  They must be run as anonymously as possible,
>>with as little connection to the ISP's assets as possible and immediately
>>disposable.  They must be easy to set up, runable without root and there
>>must be a much more efficent tracking mechanism.  (Mr. Levin has done a
>>terrific job, but even more needs to be done).
>
>	Why the first in chain? If the anti-traffic-analysis provisions are
>working properly, it should be impossible to prove that a given first remailer
>was the first remailer for any particular message. I had thought that even
>civil courts required that you be the person who committed some act, not the
>person who _might_ have committed some act. Otherwise, all the remailers are
>in danger. This is even if someone tries an entrapment by sending through some
>illegal material - if the courts accept that they should be allowed to do this,
>then all the remailers they chained are going to be hit.

Likewise, I don't see why the first address in the chain is vulnerable, as 
long as the message subsequently passes through at least one trustworthy 
remailer, and probably  a temporary output address.  



Jim Bell
jimbell@pacifier.com