From: Simon Spero <ses@tipper.oit.unc.edu>
Date: Thu, 16 May 1996 13:28:53 +0800
To: Matt Smith <msmith@rebound.slc.unisys.com>
Subject: Re: distributed keys
In-Reply-To: <199605151447.OAA17650@rebound.slc.unisys.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.SOL.3.91.960515103442.4292C-100000@chivalry>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Wed, 15 May 1996, Matt Smith wrote:

> 
> -  Having a certifying node which every other node has the public key to and
>    who has everyone else's public key.  Requests are made of this server.  
>    The trick is making this server secure and forcing the user to devote
>    resources to this endeavour.

This is the usual approach; if you use certificates, the  private 
key for the certification agency doesn't have to be (and shouldn't) be 
accessible online; thus, even if the machine serving the certificates is 
compromised, Mallet won't be able to issue false certificates. 


---
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