From: “Matt Smith” <msmith@rebound.slc.unisys.com>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Message Hash: 420329c41241abb261c52b0228b65153350564865ba1e3c1b842278049551d7d
Message ID: <199605151447.OAA17650@rebound.slc.unisys.com>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1996-05-15 22:40:54 UTC
Raw Date: Thu, 16 May 1996 06:40:54 +0800
From: "Matt Smith" <msmith@rebound.slc.unisys.com>
Date: Thu, 16 May 1996 06:40:54 +0800
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: distributed keys
Message-ID: <199605151447.OAA17650@rebound.slc.unisys.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text
Has anyone heard of an algorithm for managing keys automatically in a
distributed system?
For instance, if some low level security were to be implemented in a
a networking stack where authentication was to be implemented, you would want
to have each node have it's own signature so that signature checking can
take place when one node connects to another node. The trick is then
getting every node's keys distributed to every other node.
Here are some ideas that I had, but neither is very desireable:
- Manual distribution. User configures every node's key into every node.
Configuration becomes a major hassle and mistakes are a pain to debug.
An advantagous side effect is the user can configure which machines can
talk to which machines if they're feeling particularly facist.
- At connection time, each node determines whether or not it has the other
node's key. If not, a symmetric key is generated via DH and public keys
are exchanged. The problem comes in if someone is spoofing the machine
to begin with. Then you'll have the wrong public key. Chicken, egg.
Egg, chicken.
- Having a certifying node which every other node has the public key to and
who has everyone else's public key. Requests are made of this server.
The trick is making this server secure and forcing the user to devote
resources to this endeavour.
Thoughts?
--
Matt Smith - msmith@unislc.slc.unisys.com
"Nothing travels faster than light, with the possible exception of bad news,
which follows its own rules." - Douglas Adams, "Mostly Harmless"
Disclaimer: I came up with these ideas, so they're MINE!
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