1996-11-15 - Re: Members of Parliament Problem

Header Data

From: ph@netcom.com (Peter Hendrickson)
To: Adam Shostack <adam@homeport.org>
Message Hash: 57d7eda96fe304b76b50a43776bb03196558514f8a237ed118bf40cf35ce5513
Message ID: <v02140b02aeb235099c35@[192.0.2.1]>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1996-11-15 15:16:12 UTC
Raw Date: Fri, 15 Nov 1996 07:16:12 -0800 (PST)

Raw message

From: ph@netcom.com (Peter Hendrickson)
Date: Fri, 15 Nov 1996 07:16:12 -0800 (PST)
To: Adam Shostack <adam@homeport.org>
Subject: Re: Members of Parliament Problem
Message-ID: <v02140b02aeb235099c35@[192.0.2.1]>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


At 9:32 AM 11/15/1996, Adam Shostack wrote:
>        To answer the technical end of your question, you could build
> a DC net where joining required a signed key, or build a mix which
> will only accept messages signed by a member of the group.  If the
> mixmasters all agree to only accept messages signed by the group, then
> each mixmaster can be made a member of the group, and sign its
> outbound messages as being recieved with a signature, allowing
> anonymous chaining.

I'll have to research this.  Thank you for the idea.

What I would really like to see is a way in which the "shields" are
not required to participate at all, other than by publishing their
public key.  If terrorists are involved, they may not wish to be on
the suspect list.

I've been toying with schemes that multiply the Ns from everybody's
public key to create a new semi-anonymous public key.  The only
problem is that in each case either identity is revealed or the
person seeking semi-anonymously reveals their secret key.  So,
I am not quite there.  ;-)

Peter Hendrickson
ph@netcom.com







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