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Arise, you have nothing to lose but your barbed wire fences!

1997-01-14 - Re: Newt’s phone calls

Header Data

From: Rich Graves <rcgraves@disposable.com>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Message Hash: 07b0bf1650522aea3dfd63e70ef873003adeaaa8bbb3111e8f2535bc9f0986d5
Message ID: <32DB1232.7FB1@disposable.com>
Reply To: <Pine.GSO.3.95.970113203329.21655A-100000@cp.pathfinder.com>
UTC Datetime: 1997-01-14 04:59:28 UTC
Raw Date: Mon, 13 Jan 1997 20:59:28 -0800 (PST)

Raw message

From: Rich Graves <rcgraves@disposable.com>
Date: Mon, 13 Jan 1997 20:59:28 -0800 (PST)
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Newt's phone calls
In-Reply-To: <Pine.GSO.3.95.970113203329.21655A-100000@cp.pathfinder.com>
Message-ID: <32DB1232.7FB1@disposable.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Declan McCullagh wrote:
> 
> encrypting cell phone traffic only up to the point it hits the phone
> system wouldn't hinder L.E. access but would protect privacy. (Or,
> perhaps, would be worse in the long term since we wouldn't have such
> luscious examples.)

Actually, I wouldn't think the cops would be too hot on that idea.
Taps would require physical access to the phone network, meaning a
warrant or other specific authorization and a time delay. Worse from
the cops' perspective, the phone company will know who is being 
monitored. That means accountability, and that means leaks.

The goal will always be end-to-end "key recovery." A fixed key in the 
phone that can be cracked is much preferable to a random DH exchange, 
which would be the right way to do a last-hop-only encryption (all
from the cops' perspective, of course).

With "key recovery" currently out of favor, the cops' strategy is FUD 
and the criminalization of illegal wiretaps (by private citizens
anyway), to create a false sense of security.

In any case, evangelizing and deploying real end-to-end encryption now 
is the way to go.

-rich

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