From: Simon Spero <ses@tipper.oit.unc.edu>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Message Hash: 0b0150fef2bc48079c94a1c168e7f50382d4632cfa976ab17df1f2b93330f54f
Message ID: <Pine.SOL.3.91.951030101221.319D-100000@chivalry>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1995-10-30 18:46:42 UTC
Raw Date: Tue, 31 Oct 1995 02:46:42 +0800
From: Simon Spero <ses@tipper.oit.unc.edu>
Date: Tue, 31 Oct 1995 02:46:42 +0800
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Keyed-MD5, ITAR, and HTTP-NG
Message-ID: <Pine.SOL.3.91.951030101221.319D-100000@chivalry>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
To summarise: the consensus is that using keyed-MD5 for authentication is
ok under ITAR, but using it for confidentiality is out.
The reason I wanted to check is that I'm solidifying some of security
paramaters for HTTP-NG so we can add them to the test implementation
before the Dallas IETF. In addition to the slight problem of having half
the development team on the other side of the Atlantic, I want to make at
least a subset of the security schemes mandatory, and that means making
the core stuff exportable.
At the moment, I'm thinking of making the mandatory schemes be Keyed MD5
for authentication, and weakened RC4 with an IV for confidentiality, with
the added stipulation being that the user must be informed when key
weakening is being used. I may swap RC4 for DES; they're both public
domain, but RC4 is simpler. They're both shared key, but I don't make PK
stuff mandatory.
The other pre-defined schemes I'm planning on getting at least speced are
3-DES and IDEA for confidetiality, SHA for hashing, and RSA & DH for
key exchange, signatures, and authentication. Certificate format is
currently X.509- PGP format will go in ASAP.
Simon
---
(defun modexpt (x y n) "computes (x^y) mod n"
(cond ((= y 0) 1) ((= y 1) (mod x n))
((evenp y) (mod (expt (modexpt x (/ y 2) n) 2) n))
(t (mod (* x (modexpt x (1- y) n)) n))))
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