1995-10-31 - Re: Keyed-MD5, ITAR, and HTTP-NG

Header Data

From: Simon Spero <ses@tipper.oit.unc.edu>
To: hallam@w3.org
Message Hash: ba628951286826fab6f38a5f935595b33c659fdb9d434eeb36f32486063cd664
Message ID: <Pine.SOL.3.91.951030172638.429C-100000@chivalry>
Reply To: <9510302351.AA28243@zorch.w3.org>
UTC Datetime: 1995-10-31 02:21:14 UTC
Raw Date: Tue, 31 Oct 1995 10:21:14 +0800

Raw message

From: Simon Spero <ses@tipper.oit.unc.edu>
Date: Tue, 31 Oct 1995 10:21:14 +0800
To: hallam@w3.org
Subject: Re: Keyed-MD5, ITAR, and HTTP-NG
In-Reply-To: <9510302351.AA28243@zorch.w3.org>
Message-ID: <Pine.SOL.3.91.951030172638.429C-100000@chivalry>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Mon, 30 Oct 1995 hallam@w3.org wrote:

> 	Do not spec Keyed MD5, it is a complete looser. It is actually weak
> against a number of attacks. There are much better constructs for creating

What I've heard is that there are some worries about using short 
constants with MD5; maybe you could fill us in on the naughty stuff 
(someone said there were a load of papers in Crypto '95 on the subject?)

> 
> 	There is some work by Phil Rogaway on making keyed digest functions
> which I strongly recommend people look at. I can post a paper on the subject if 
> people are interested.

Hey, you got a web-site? :-)

Simon

----
(defun modexpt (x y n)  "computes (x^y) mod n"
  (cond ((= y 0) 1) 	((= y 1) (mod x n))
	((evenp y) (mod (expt (modexpt x (/ y 2) n) 2) n))
	(t (mod (* x (modexpt x (1- y) n)) n))))






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