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1996-07-18 - Re: How I Would Ban Strong Crypto in the U.S.

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From: Yap Remailer <remailer@yap.pactitle.com>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Message Hash: d2cceb1f936e3ac83c5f1d2bd8eabc811304631895abea56e24d55b54eeca271
Message ID: <199607161935.MAA07689@yap.pactitle.com>
Reply To: <ae0efb9f020210046227@[205.199.118.202]>
UTC Datetime: 1996-07-18 00:58:54 UTC
Raw Date: Thu, 18 Jul 1996 08:58:54 +0800

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From: Yap Remailer <remailer@yap.pactitle.com>
Date: Thu, 18 Jul 1996 08:58:54 +0800
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: How I Would Ban Strong Crypto in the U.S.
In-Reply-To: <ae0efb9f020210046227@[205.199.118.202]>
Message-ID: <199607161935.MAA07689@yap.pactitle.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
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> There has been some discussion at the last couple of crypto conferences
> about possible ways around this plan.  (I guess the idea goes back at
> least a year or two.)
> 
> One idea is to register a 2048 bit public key.  You have to give the
> secret key to the government in order to use the registry.  But what you
> do is to create a second key and embed it in the first.  It is, say, a
> 1024 bit key which is the lower half of the 2048 bit key.  It has
> different secret factors that nobody but you knows.  Then when people
> send you messages they encrypt using this modulus rather than the
> official one.
> 
> You get the benefit of the government-sponsored key certificate
> infrastructure, but the government is not able to crack your
> communications.

Sorry, but the government generates all keys.  Otherwise people might
mess up and choose insecure keys.

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