From: John Young <jya@pipeline.com>
To: cypherpunks@cyberpass.net
Message Hash: b22b16e98bdeb5ca9ad177828505e031aa527f8e03c6432bb707c9ec196d31a7
Message ID: <Version.32.19980907073131.00fb96e0@pop.pipeline.com>
Reply To: <Pine.GSO.3.95.980906221144.24713B-100000@cp.pathfinder.com>
UTC Datetime: 1998-09-07 12:27:49 UTC
Raw Date: Mon, 7 Sep 1998 20:27:49 +0800
From: John Young <jya@pipeline.com>
Date: Mon, 7 Sep 1998 20:27:49 +0800
To: cypherpunks@cyberpass.net
Subject: Re: What we are Fighting
In-Reply-To: <Pine.GSO.3.95.980906221144.24713B-100000@cp.pathfinder.com>
Message-ID: <Version.32.19980907073131.00fb96e0@pop.pipeline.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Tim asks:
>Freeh and Company continue to mumble about "meeting
>the legitmate needs of law enforcement." What can they
>be speaking of?
...
>Obviously his side is contemplating domestic crypto restrictions.
Threat of terrorism will be the impetus for applying national security
restrictions domestically, for relaxing cold war limitations on spying
on Americans, for dissolving barriers between law enforcement
and military/intelligence agencies.
Technical means for access to encrypted data will probably
come first in communications, then to stored material. There
will be an agreement for increased CALEA wiretap funding, which
is what the two cellular and wired suits against the FBI intend,
(paralleling what the hardware and software industries want from
federal buyers of security products).
This will provide the infrastructural regime for the gov to monitor
and store domestic traffic as NSA does for the global, using the
same technology (NSA may provide service to domestic
LEA as it now does for other gov customers for intel).
Other access will come through hardware and software for
computers, paralleling technology developed for telecomm tapping,
tracking and monitoring.
Most probably through overt/covert features of microprocessors
and OS's, as reported recently of Wintel and others, but also
probably with special chips for DSP and software for modular
design -- why build from scratch when these handy kits are
available.
As noted here, the features will appear first as optional, in response
to demand from commerce, from parents, from responsible
institutions, to meet public calls for protection, for privacy, for
combating threats to the American people.
Like wiretap law, use of the features for preventative snooping will
initially require a court order, as provided in several of the crypto
legislative proposals.
Like the wiretap orders, gradually there will be no secret court refusals
for requests to use the technology in the national interest.
A publicity campain will proclaims that citizens with nothing to hide
will have nothing to fear. Assurance of safety will be transparent,
no clicks on the line. In a digital world, home-office devices will send
lifestyle data to the device manufacturers over the always monitoring
transparental Net.
Personal privacy will evaporate almost unnoticeably, as with the tv
remote control, cp/defcon/bar brag, telephone, fax and forever-lovers
pillowtalk.
Return to September 1998
Return to “Tim May <tcmay@got.net>”