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1995-11-09 - Re: Exporting software doesn’t mean exporting

Header Data

From: Sten Drescher <dreschs@mpd.tandem.com>
To: Adam Shostack <adam@lighthouse.homeport.org>
Message Hash: 3bbbc86838dce827d2eec499759ffe2a86d7ec59bbdad4af8f20c9cefa921407
Message ID: <199511081517.JAA00972@galil.austnsc.tandem.com.>
Reply To: <199511080054.QAA29419@email.pdcorp.com>
UTC Datetime: 1995-11-09 00:09:21 UTC
Raw Date: Thu, 9 Nov 1995 08:09:21 +0800

Raw message

From: Sten Drescher <dreschs@mpd.tandem.com>
Date: Thu, 9 Nov 1995 08:09:21 +0800
To: Adam Shostack <adam@lighthouse.homeport.org>
Subject: Re: Exporting software doesn't mean exporting
In-Reply-To: <199511080054.QAA29419@email.pdcorp.com>
Message-ID: <199511081517.JAA00972@galil.austnsc.tandem.com.>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Adam Shostack <adam@lighthouse.homeport.org> said:

AS> 	Thus, if the user in Italy has no reason to expect that their
AS> mail to Germany will traverse the US, then I suspect that the US
AS> would have a hard time proving any criminal act.  Doesn't a criminal
AS> act require intent of some type?  If IP routing, in conjunction with
AS> SMTP, beyond the control of the users, ships packets through the US,
AS> I have a hard time believing that that makes those users criminals.

	IANAL, but if they have the intent to transfer cryptographic
software, and can 'reasonably' (wonderful precision there) be expected
to know that there is the potential for portions of the transfer to be
routed through US systems, then I'm guessing that it could be construed
that they had the intent to commit a crime.

-- 
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