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1997-07-18 - Re: Keepers of the keys

Header Data

From: Carl Ellison <cme@cybercash.com>
To: Declan McCullagh <declan@well.com>
Message Hash: 4cafef77f72a5c9648efdf974738d804eb71251adfaf293ca71b330c9e629032
Message ID: <3.0.3.32.19970718172701.00969de0@cybercash.com>
Reply To: <Pine.GSO.3.95.970718124449.26795G-100000@well.com>
UTC Datetime: 1997-07-18 22:21:40 UTC
Raw Date: Sat, 19 Jul 1997 06:21:40 +0800

Raw message

From: Carl Ellison <cme@cybercash.com>
Date: Sat, 19 Jul 1997 06:21:40 +0800
To: Declan McCullagh <declan@well.com>
Subject: Re: Keepers of the keys
In-Reply-To: <Pine.GSO.3.95.970718124449.26795G-100000@well.com>
Message-ID: <3.0.3.32.19970718172701.00969de0@cybercash.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



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I'm really surprised to see this entire discussion resurface, especially 
without any apparent memory of the past 5 years that have hashed this topic 
over.

The real issue, IMHO, is given in my 
http://www.clark.net/pub/cme/html/avss.html

Hitting closer to home for those of us who design crypto:

Our job is to permit Alice to communicate to Bob (or Alice at a later time) 
without Eve getting anything from that communication.

			+---+
			| E |
			+---+
			  ^
  +---+		  |		  +---+
  | A |-------------+---------->| B |
  +---+				  +---+

			
The gov't wants us to achieve that goal but permit Dorothy the detective, D, to 
have access:


			+---+
			| D |
			+---+
			  ^
  +---+		  |		  +---+
  | A |-------------+---------->| B |
  +---+				  +---+

Those two diagrams are identical except for labeling.  How can we tell E from 
D, as crypto designers?  Was J. Edgar Hoover an E or a D?  Nixon?  The LA 
Intelligence unit?  ....?

Meanwhile, the system to allow D but not E is hugely more complex than the 
system which prohibits both D and E.  And, as I argue elsewhere, 
<http://www.clark.net/pub/cme/html/ukgak/>, good strong non-GAK crypto in the 
hands of criminals should help law enforcement in their surveillance effort -- 
because:

1)	it encourages criminals to talk about their crimes with other criminals
2)	some percentage of those "other criminals" will be plants, informers or 
turned,
	thus giving law enforcement an intelligence boon
3)	traffic analysis of these criminal conversations is not inhibited

 - Carl

At 12:45 PM 7/18/97 -0700, Declan McCullagh wrote:
>
>
>---------- Forwarded message ----------
>Date: Fri, 18 Jul 1997 12:04:56 -0700 (PDT)
>From: Joe Shea <joeshea@netcom.com>
>To: Declan McCullagh <declan@well.com>
>Cc: fight-censorship-announce@vorlon.mit.edu
>Subject: Re: FC: Brookings Inst. on crypto: "There are reasonable compromises"
>
>
>	Declan, what would you think if the actual keepers of the keys, 
>so to speak, were the courts, such as the Administratoive Office of the 
>US Courts?  That would at least seem to reduce a lot of the possible
>privacy concerns.  One has the sense that once they get into the hands of 
>the varius agencies, they'll get back out.
>
>Best,
>
>Joe Shea
>Editor-in-Chief
>The American Reporter
>joeshea@netcom.com
>http://www.newshare.com:9999
>
>
>
>

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|Carl M. Ellison  cme@cybercash.com   http://www.clark.net/pub/cme |
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